

COMMISSION ON CRITICAL CHOICES FOR AMERICANS

22 WEST FIFTY-FIFTH STREET
NEW YORK, NEW YORK 10019
TELEPHONE: (212) 977-9320

NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER
Chairman

March 12, 1974

Dear Henry:

Enclosed is the agenda for the Commission's meeting in Austin, Texas on April first and second. The press has requested that they be allowed to attend as much of the meeting as possible. Therefore, we are planning to open all meetings except those which are marked "Executive Session" on the enclosed agenda.

Also enclosed is a notebook which includes the draft working outlines for Panels IV, V and VI and the draft outlines for Panels I, II and III which I sent you earlier, and the list of the members of each panel.

In the hope that you will be able to make the Austin meeting, we have made tentative hotel reservations for you at the Sheraton Crest Inn. I have asked Mr. James Cannon to be in touch with you to see if he could be of any assistance in helping to make it possible for you to attend this important meeting of the Commission.

With warm regard,

Sincerely,



The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
The Secretary of State
Department of State
2201 C Street, N.W.
Washington, D. C. 20520

AGENDA

SECOND MEETING

COMMISSION ON CRITICAL CHOICES FOR AMERICANS

LYNDON B. JOHNSON LIBRARY

AUSTIN, TEXAS

APRIL 1 - APRIL 2, 1974

MONDAY, APRIL 1

9:15 WELCOME: Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson

9:30 OPENING REMARKS -- Chairman Rockefeller

10:00 DISCUSSION: FOOD, HEALTH, WORLD POPULATION AND
QUALITY OF LIFE (PANEL II)

Presentations:

Food: Mr. Lester Brown, Senior Fellow
Overseas Development Council

Discussion by Panel and Commission

Health: Dr. John Knowles, President
Rockefeller Foundation

Discussion by Panel and Commission

Population: Dr. Bernard Berelson, President
The Population Council

Discussion by Panel and Commission

1:00 LUNCHEON: Speaker, Dr. Walt W. Rostow
Professor of Economics and History
University of Texas

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MONDAY, APRIL 1 CONTD.

2:30 DISCUSSION: MAN'S NATURE AND HIS INSTITUTIONS

Moderator: Mr. Irving Kristol
Henry Luce Professor of Urban Values
New York University

Participants: Professor Martin Diamond
Department of Political Science
University of Northern Illinois

Professor James Q. Wilson
Department of Government
Harvard University

Professor Thomas Sowell
Associate Professor of Economics
UCLA

4:00 EXECUTIVE SESSION
Discussion of Commission Program

7:00 RECEPTION AND BUFFET
In Honor of the Commission

Hosts: Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson
Mr. Belton Kleberg Johnson

TUESDAY, APRIL 2

9:15 DISCUSSION: ENERGY, ECOLOGY, ECONOMICS AND
WORLD STABILITY (PANEL I)

Presentations:

Energy: Mr. Jack H. Bridges, Director
National Energy Program
Center for Strategic and International
Studies

Discussion by Panel and Commission

Ecology: Dr. Russell W. Peterson, Chairman
The President's Council on
Environmental Quality

Discussion by Panel and Commission

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TUESDAY, APRIL 2 CONTD.

Energy & Technology: Dr. Edward Teller, University Professor
University of California
Lawrence Livermore Laboratory

Discussion by Panel and Commission

Economics: Mr. John G. Winger, Vice President
The Chase Manhattan Bank, N.A.

Discussion by Panel and Commission

World Stability: Mr. Herman Kahn, Founding Director
Hudson Institute

Discussion by Panel and Commission

12:30 LUNCHEON

1:30 EXECUTIVE SESSION
Discussion of Panel Procedures

3:00 ADJOURNMENT



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APPROVED BY THE SECRETARY

S/P - MR. LORD

S/S - SEFRY

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TO MR E DONALD CHALLIS WELLS RICH GREENE INC 767 FIFTH
AVENUE NEW YORK CITY NY 10022

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SUBJECT: MESSAGE TO BE READ AT DINNER TONIGHT HONORING
GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER

1. MR. CHALLIS: I DEEPLY REGRET THAT I AM UNABLE TO BE
WITH YOU TONIGHT TO HONOR GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER. PLEASE
DELIVER ON MY BEHALF THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE:

2. IN HONORING NELSON ROCKEFELLER TONIGHT WE HONOR AS
WELL A GREAT AMERICAN FAMILY.. THE NAME ROCKEFELLER HAS
LONG BEEN SYNONOMOUS WITH DEDICATED SERVICE -- SERVICE
TO NEW YORK, SERVICE TO AMERICA, SERVICE TO ALL MANKIND.
THE ROCKEFELLER TRADITION OF DEVOTION TO HUMANITY IS AN
EXAMPLE TO US ALL. AND NELSON ROCKEFELLER SYMBOLIZES
THE VERY ESSENCE OF THAT TRADITION.

3. IT IS HARD FOR ME TO DESCRIBE WHAT WE OWE NELSON
ROCKEFELLER. HIS SUPPORT AND ENCOURAGEMENT IN THE FIRST
TWO DECADES OF MY PUBLIC LIFE ARE WELL KNOWN. NOW I OWE
HIM MY WIFE AND THUS MY HAPPINESS FOR THE NEXT TWO
DECADES AND BEYOND.

4. BUT I HONOR NELSON FOR MORE THAN WHAT HE HAS MEANT TO
ME. WE HONOR HIM AS A STATESMAN. HE IS AN EXECUTIVE
NOT ONLY OF SKILL AND COURAGE BUT EVEN MORE, OF VISION

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exercise

THAT IS THE TRUE QUALITY OF LEADERSHIP. HE HAS FACED PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AS AN ~~EXECUTIVE~~ NOT SIMPLY OF MANAGEMENT BUT OF THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF GREAT PURPOSES.

5. AS A NATIONAL STATESMAN HE HAS HELPED AMERICAN PRESIDENTS SHAPE THEIR FOREIGN POLICY TOWARD THE HEMISPHERE AND THE WORLD. HE WAS AMONG THE FIRST TO PERCEIVE THE NEED TO GENERATE A NEW AMERICAN CONSENSUS TO GUIDE THIS NATION OVER THE LAST THIRD OF THIS CENTURY. OUR OWN FRIENDSHIP BEGAN WHEN I JOINED HIS STAFF IN 1956 IN THE SPECIAL STUDIES PROJECT TO IDENTIFY THE OPPORTUNITIES AND THE CHALLENGES BEFORE THE UNITED STATES. IT IS A MEASURE OF HIS VISION -- AND HIS REFUSAL TO BE TURNED ASIDE BY MONUMENTAL TASKS -- THAT HIS SEARCH FOR NATIONAL CONSENSUS HAS BEEN RENEWED IN THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON CRITICAL CHOICES FOR AMERICA.

6. IT IS FOR HIS ACHIEVEMENTS AS GOVERNOR OF NEW YORK THAT NELSON ROCKEFELLER IS BEING HONORED TONIGHT. HE HAS MANAGED A GOVERNMENT MORE VAST AND COMPLEX THAN THAT OF ALL BUT A FEW FOREIGN NATIONS. AND HE HAS DONE SO WITH HIS CUSTOMARY EXCELLENCE AND INNOVATIVE IDEAS.

7. HE THUS EXEMPLIFIES THE FINEST OF EXECUTIVE ABILITY, AND IS THEREFORE A MOST FITTING RECIPIENT OF THIS AWARD.

8. ALL THESE QUALITIES -- AND MANY MORE -- ARE A MATTER OF COMMON KNOWLEDGE AND PUBLIC RECORD. BUT NELSON ROCKEFELLER, MY PERSONAL FRIEND, IS AS DESERVING OF PRAISE AND ADMIRATION AS NELSON ROCKEFELLER, STATESMAN AND PUBLIC SERVANT. I KNOW OF NO FINER, MORE INSPIRING, MORE COMPASSIONATE HUMAN BEING. KISSINGER

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30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10020

Room 5600

Circle 7-3700

July 30, 1974

Dear Peter:

I am deeply grateful for your help in getting the Governor's "Open Skies" files declassified.

Jim Cannon passed them on to me. Thanks also for returning my related files and letters.

All the best,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to read 'H. Morrow'.

Hugh Morrow

Mr. Peter W. Rodman
The White House
Washington, D. C.

In early 1969, after Dr. Kissinger left Governor Rockefeller's employ and before joining the White House staff, Governor Rockefeller told Dr. Kissinger that he wanted to make a \$50,000 gift to him at the close of their some 15 years of association.

Before accepting the gift, Dr. Kissinger discussed the matter with the then President-elect and his counsel. Written clearance to accept the gift was received by Dr. Kissinger from the office of the Counsel to the President-elect.

Dr. Kissinger has put the \$50,000 into trusts for his two children and filed gift tax returns covering those gifts to his children. He understands that Governor Rockefeller filed a gift tax return on the gift to him.

10/4/74

January 17, 1969

Dear Henry:

You know the admiration that I have felt over many years for the teaching, the research, and the publications in which you have been engaged -- all directed toward helping the American people to understand and formulate wisdom and foreign policy. I have also benefitted often from your wise counsel during the years of our association.

As a token of my friendship and my appreciation for the work you have done in service to the people of this country, I am arranging to have a gift made to you in the amount of \$50,000. It comes from Happy and me, with our warmest best wishes.

Sincerely,

Nelson

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Room 1035
50 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, New York

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: DR. HENRY A. KISSINGER
FROM: OFFICE OF THE COUNSEL
SUBJECT: Conflict

You have requested that we advise you regarding a contemplated gift of money from Governor Rockefeller in light of the statutes, Executive Order and regulations applying to conflict of interests for members of the President's staff.

You have stated to us that you have been a personal friend of the Governor and his brothers for some years, have worked for them personally on many occasions. There is obviously no question that they not only have a high regard for your work but feel a close personal kinship as a result of your many years of association.

Further, you advised us that your work was done for the family rather than on a consulting basis through any governmental agency.

Based upon the philanthropic nature of the Rockefellers, and expressly upon the fact that the contemplated gift of money to you is based only upon your close personal

friendship and is a direct result of not only that friendship but high personal esteem in which they hold you, we find that such a gift would not violate either the statutes, Executive Order or regulations involving conflict of interests.

Edward L. Morgan

Deputy Counsel

Egil Krogh, Jr.

Deputy Counsel

No Objection To Declassification in Full 20
11/04/28 : LOC-HAK-431-1-9-2

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Donna Mitchell
in Gov. Rockefeller's
office

I am at No Objection To Declassification in Full 2011/04/
I made in 28: LOC-HAK-431-1-9-2 I discussed the
relationship of the United States ~~and~~ and
its North Atlantic allies and in that context
the organization of Western nuclear defense.
It is clear in those speeches that I
was ~~discussing~~ discussing the US Government's
view of the relationship between US and
European ~~national~~ nuclear forces, ~~and that~~
I did not propose relinquishing the U.S.
veto over the use of American nuclear
weapons. In fact, I stated the ^{exact} opposite
in ~~my~~ address of April 25, 1963.

As for supplying nuclear weapons to
other countries, ~~any country today~~, I fully support the
prohibitions ^{that are written} into our own law and in the
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). As you know,
our ~~the~~ Government's policy is to work
to strengthen the effectiveness of the NPT
~~and I support this as a matter of~~
~~international urgency.~~
and to strengthen other safeguards, I fully
support this effort.

Dec 6, 1979

QUESTION

from Mrs. Hultzman

In 1963, you criticized President Kennedy for insisting upon an American veto over the use of American nuclear weapons given to NATO. Do you still believe that the United States should supply NATO or any country with nuclear weapons over ~~which~~ whose use the United States retains no veto?

I am attaching copies of two speeches I made in 1963 in which I discussed the relationship of the United States and NATO and in that context the organization of nuclear defense. I discussed the American veto question in the context of the Administration's apparent policy to keep the European NATO nations from building their own nuclear force and the need to build a true partnership in NATO. I did not advocate the relinquishing of an American veto over the use of American nuclear weapons given to NATO. In fact in the speech of April 25th I said:

"In other words, the proposed so-called "Multilateral" nuclear force neither meets nor changes the situation which has given rise to European pressures for a measure of nuclear defense autonomy.

"We would continue to hold the final voice in nuclear matters. This may be what the Administration wants, but no matter how disguised with labels of multilateralism, it clearly is neither partnership nor community.

"It might be argued that we could or would eventually give up the veto. No doubt we will be

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subjected to pressures in that direction once such a mixed-crew force exists. Yet as long as NATO is composed of sovereign states, such an arrangement is unworkable.

"This country cannot commit itself to go nuclear war on the basis of a majority vote of its allies, however close those allies may be. Indeed, if we could make such a commitment, a "multilateral" force would not be necessary".

With regard to the present situation any actions would obviously have to be in accord with the Nuclear Proliferation Treaty, ^{our} or obligations to NATO and the law [which requires that the United States have a veto over the use of nuclear weapons supplied by the U. S. ?]

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PUBLIC PAPERS OF GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER

Private Enterprise

I hardly need remind this audience that Roman Hruska is one who deeply believes in our private enterprise system and the American way of life.

The son of an immigrant from Czechoslovakia, he worked his way through high school, college and law school, as newsboy, switchboard operator, truck driver, window shade installer and bookkeeper.

For almost a quarter of a century before his election to the Congress in 1952, he practiced law here in Omaha—and any lawyer will agree that there is no freer enterprise than that, with all its risks and all its opportunities to advance through hard work and ability.

Freedom of Information

One thing about Roman Hruska which struck me was his candor—and again he reflects the people he represents.

Here in Nebraska, I've noticed, people say what they mean and mean what they say—and that's the kind of people I like.

One of the worst influences in public life today is the fact that far too many in high places are more concerned with their public image than they are concerned with public service.

As far as I'm concerned, if you perform the public service to the best of your ability, the public image will pretty well take care of itself—and Roman Hruska is proof of that.

Service rather than "sophistication," candor rather than mere cleverness, integrity rather than public imagery—these are the hallmarks of a man you can depend on.

No public official has a right to try to fool *any* of the people *any* of the time. Anyone who won't trust the people with the truth doesn't really trust himself.

Equal Opportunity

For the plainmen who endured untold hardships to settle and develop this State, for the families from many lands—like the Hruskas—who have taken root in this fertile soil of freedom and grown and given back to this land even more than they have received, equality of opportunity has deep meaning.

And equality of opportunity also implies equality of protection and immunities—equal justice before the law. Once more, I refer to our guest of honor and this time to the fact that Roman Hruska was a leading force behind the Senate's passage last year of a public defender bill to provide legal aid for Federal prisoners lacking funds to employ counsel.

**At 50th Anniversary Dinner, Bureau of Advertising of the
American Newspaper Publishers Association, Hotel Waldorf-
Astoria, New York City, April 25, 1963 (Excerpts)**

*The Relationship of the United States to Her European Allies and Our Common
Defense in This Nuclear Age*

I appreciate the honor of your invitation to attend this 50th anniversary dinner and to meet with the leadership of the free American press—the great catalyst of our democratic society.

We meet together in a mutual interest—you as men and women with the high responsibility and authority of the world's greatest free press, and I as one among the public officials whose actions and purposes must daily stand the light of examination by that free press if they are to be effective or meaningful.

I want to speak to you tonight about a problem which in my view is in need of a full and dispassionate public discussion: the relationship of the United States to her European allies and our common defense in this nuclear age.

The vitality of this relationship is the cornerstone of a dynamic and expanding free world system, which is our common goal.

The future of freedom and the nature of the society in which our children will live will depend on the wisdom with which we and our allies deal with the challenges and opportunities before us.

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The major characteristics of the contemporary world are the radical and fundamental changes that are taking place and which vitally affect the nature of our relationships in dealing with the great problems of human concern.

All over the world, free peoples are striving for dignity, opportunity and a meaning to their lives.

The relations of the nations bordering the North Atlantic must be an integral and dynamic part of an evolving political framework ultimately encompassing all free peoples.

Tragically, their aspirations for peace and freedom have been and continue to be profoundly challenged by a ruthless and relentless Communist totalitarianism bent on world domination. Communist obstructionism has crippled the effectiveness of the United Nations as originally conceived, and has forced the peoples of the free world to an increasing extent to work out the kind of regional and special arrangements provided by Article 51 of the United Nations Charter—accords for the joint furtherance of defense, of economic growth, and, increasingly, close political cooperation.

These regional arrangements, as history continues to teach us, are essential for the preservation of freedom and peace. No free nation, large or small, can any longer survive in isolation.

No single nation, not even the United States, can alone shoulder the responsibility or bear the burden for free world defense or for the free world's economic progress.

There is urgent need for the rapid development of these new regional arrangements based on the concept of free peoples freely associating in their common interest—so different from the balance-of-power alliances of the past.

As these regional arrangements develop, we require a new order of political thinking. How can the interests of each regional group be related to the overall interests of the free world? The blending of national, regional and general interests is the ultimate test of our political creativity.

It is not an easy prescription. It calls for renewed faith in the capacity of free men to master their destiny, for a vision of free societies that are dedicated to ever-expanding areas of freedom.

Tonight I will discuss the implications of these concepts for one part of the world—Western Europe—and one aspect of our relations with that area: the organization of nuclear power for the defense of freedom.

On February 9, I expressed my deep concern about the present disarray in the Western Alliance. My concern was not with specific manifestations of disunity—worrisome as these are—nor with the expressions of dissatisfaction by some allied leaders, for such disagreement is not necessarily a conclusive indictment of our policies. In the readjustment of relationships which is going on between Europe and ourselves, a measure of disagreement is inevitable.

However, inter-allied disputes have become needlessly sharp because we have been dealing with the dynamic new forces in Europe under patterns and concepts developed a decade and a half ago. This has set up political and psychological clashes which have been accentuated by an over-concern with tactics and a tendency to treat symptoms and not causes.

Americans are united in the desire for peace and security, for the growth of human freedom and of individual well-being. In pursuit of these goals, we as a nation are involved in delicate and complex relationships—but it is the strength of our political system that we are able to submit to the forum of public opinion our differences as to the means of achieving them.

This procedure is essential if free men are to participate in the decision-making process of a free society. This is something no group knows better than you.

II. The Organization of Nuclear Defense

For the past two years, the Western Alliance has been divided by increasingly sharp disputes about the control of nuclear weapons. It is easy to get lost in highly technical debates. The fundamental issue, however, is not technical; it is how to organize a voluntary association of free peoples, working together for the common interest.

The deepest problem is our failure to recognize the new Europe which has emerged over the past fourteen years—and emerged importantly as a result of

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PUBLIC PAPERS OF GOVERNOR ROCKEFELLER

the wise and farsighted policies of the Truman and Eisenhower Administrations.

Fourteen years ago, when NATO was established: Europe was impoverished by the war and completely dependent on the United States; Europe was divided by suspicions from generations of conflict; Europe had lost its confidence and sense of identity.

Today, Europe—with our assistance—in the short space of fourteen years has become the third most powerful economic entity in the world; Europe, despite setbacks which are hopefully temporary, is becoming increasingly cohesive; Europe has rediscovered its sense of identity and is asserting it.

In the military field, the changes have been equally dramatic: fourteen years ago, the United States had an atomic monopoly; Europe possessed few resources for its own defense; in these circumstances, the newly created NATO came close to being a unilateral United States guarantee of Europe, backed up by the U. S. nuclear power.

Today, the Soviet nuclear arsenal has grown to the point at which it threatens the very existence of every country in the West. Europe is now strong enough in the face of this challenge to want to assume a greater degree of self-reliance and a larger measure of the responsibility for its own defense. Illustrative of this is the fact that Great Britain and France have been engaged in multi-billion dollar nuclear weapons development programs for their own defense.

We as a people must face the harsh reality that it will never be possible to re-establish a United States atomic monopoly.

The growing strength of Europe is a sign of health and vigor. Americans should take pride in it. We helped to make it possible. But we have failed to act on the fact that it is in our own best interest to adjust our policies to the new realities of these radically changed conditions.

In light of these realities, there is only one course open to the free world. That course is to devise a North Atlantic political arrangement within which nuclear weapons can be controlled and deployed for the common good of all free peoples.

In seeking such a structure, there are two possibilities:

1. A single, indivisible control of all Atlantic community nuclear forces—which is tenable in the long run only through a political merger of all the sovereign states involved. This is not possible now. We are not ready for the major sharing of sovereignty this would require.

Until such a political arrangement evolves—and this will not happen soon or without great and imaginative effort—it is both futile and counter-productive for us to take a doctrinaire position against the evolution of nuclear capability in an emerging Europe. We must therefore go to the other possibility.

2. A genuine political partnership of strong and independent nations committed to sharing agreed nuclear responsibilities for the common defense of the Atlantic area.

Though the Administration has talked a great deal about partnership, it is treating our friends of the Atlantic Alliance as dependent allies rather than independent partners.

The Administration in its policies and actions has, in fact, been extremely ambivalent; in the economic field, it has talked of equal partnership, of the importance of European integration and of common European action, but in the nuclear field, it has discouraged the emergence of any European identity.

Much as some want to turn back the clock and restore the U. S. monopoly of nuclear weapons, such an attitude flies in the face of existing realities.

It ignores the basic motivations behind the existing European nuclear programs. It overlooks the fact that the economically powerful, increasingly cohesive and self-confident Europe—which we have fostered—will not forever accept complete dependence on the United States for its own security.

Instead of a viable course of partnership, the administration has put forth a seeming third alternative—an ostensible but illusory "multilateral" approach. This effort has been marked by vacillation and inconsistencies.

The tendency has been to blur the realities with which we must deal, to obscure the problem of proud and strong allies seeking a measure of self-reliance for their own defense, and as a result to avoid the political solutions which must be devised.

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More than this, the illusory and shifting proposals we have made recently have undermined our political credit, not only with respect to nuclear weapons, but in our overall relations with Europe as well.

Let me illustrate: The Secretary of Defense has attacked the nuclear programs of our allies as "dangerous," and the President has called them "inimical" to the Alliance.

Yet a week after the President had made a statement to this same general effect, he signed the Nassau Agreement in which the United States offered to supply Polaris missiles to Great Britain and France.

Great Britain and France were to "assign" their nuclear forces to a "multilateral" NATO force—but they were to be free to withdraw their forces "where supreme national interests are at stake." As a result, Prime Minister Macmillan finds himself in the anomalous situation of having an agreement which was offered to him by the United States attacked by his political opposition on the basis of the Administration's own arguments that separate European nuclear capabilities are "dangerous," and "inimical."

As for France, even a leader less suspicious of U. S. motives than President DeGaulle might find himself baffled as to our real purposes. It is difficult for even the most well-disposed allies to follow our lead when our declaratory policies and our action policies are inconsistent and inconstant.

As for our own people here at home, we must not obscure the stark reality that control over the development and use of nuclear weapons no longer lies exclusively within our own initiative. Nor must we confuse slogans of "multilateral" action with the reality of partnership.

The Administration has been investing a great deal of United States prestige in pressuring our allies to accept two types of so-called "multilateral" forces: one is a grouping of national nuclear forces to be assigned to NATO, including a component of U. S. Polaris submarines; the other is a fleet of missile-carrying merchant ships manned by mixed crews of different nationalities.

Periodically we report "progress" towards "multilateralism," but in actual fact, neither of these two types of forces is really multilateral. One is a collection of national forces subject to ultimate national control; the other is effectively under United States control through the veto.

Thus, both of our so-called "multilateral" proposals have evaded facing up to the fundamental issue of whether our European allies are to have the same right regarding the use of nuclear weapons in their own defense on which we insist for ourselves.

Let us look for a moment at the proposed force composed of national contingents. It can be called "multilateral" only in a symbolic sense.

The British Polaris submarines and their V-Bombers, for example, "assigned" to NATO, are effectively under British control. The provision in the Nassau Agreement that Britain is free to use its nuclear forces independently, when the supreme national interest is at stake, illustrates this. The supreme national interest is necessarily at stake whenever the use of nuclear weapons is at issue.

Similarly, the chain of command to U. S. submarines "assigned" to NATO remains effectively in U. S. hands.

I do not object to such an assignment. Indeed I welcome it as a useful step toward Atlantic cooperation. But we should not engage in the self-delusion that it is in fact a "multilateral" force.

Is it really progress toward a "multilateral" nuclear force to "assign" some French fighter bombers to a NATO nuclear force, when, in reality, all that has happened is to shift them from General Lemnitzer in his capacity as Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, to General Lemnitzer in his capacity as NATO Nuclear Force Commander?

If this "assignment" does anything, it erodes the distinction between tactical defense and strategic nuclear defense even further.

The academic nature of our approach is shown by the fact that within the last two months, the name of the proposed force composed of national contingents has been successively changed from "multilateral" to "multinational" to "interallied," without any change of our substantive proposals.

The tendency to treat substantive matters with essentially verbal solutions evades the hard realities of the changing times in which we live.

The situation is even more confused with respect to the second so-called "multilateral" force proposed by the Administration: the merchant ships

manned by mixed crews drawn from various NATO nationalities. One of the first difficulties with this proposal is that the Administration has changed it so often that even our best friends no longer know what we really want.

For nearly two years, the Administration indicated that we might "consider" a NATO sea-based nuclear force—though we thought it unnecessary.

In the middle of last January, Undersecretary of State Ball suddenly told the NATO Council that we were ready to begin training submarine crews for the proposed "multilateral" force. Surface ships were then described by high Administration officials as too vulnerable to be useful.

Two weeks later, however, the Administration suddenly proposed that the missiles for the NATO nuclear force be installed on merchant ships. The President indicated that the vulnerability of these ships was not a problem because they could hide in the broad Atlantic—and in any case an attack on merchant ships would lead to general war.

I have serious doubts about the invulnerability of missile launching merchant ships. We are not building any such ships as part of our own defense forces. And such a program runs counter to our own intensive submarine building program and our offer of Polaris submarines for Britain. It is the exact opposite of what we had told our European allies before February.

In any event, Polaris-launching merchant ships are certain to be identified by the Soviets and in periods of crisis would be tailed by Soviet submarines—all the more so as the area of the Soviets would have to search would be limited by the range of Polaris missiles.

With the British in the curious position of now being asked by us to participate in two multilateral forces—one composed of submarines and one of merchant ships—it is no wonder that other European countries, offered merchant ships alone, are concerned as to whether we are palming off on them a second-best system.

I also question the wisdom of the so-called "multilateral" force of mixed crews on its merits. The primary purpose of this force is said to be to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, to preclude the Federal Republic of Germany from acquiring nuclear warheads under national control, to create a counterweight to France's nuclear aspirations and to give Europe a greater voice in nuclear matters.

In my view, the multilateral force composed of mixed crews will do none of these things.

This becomes apparent when we examine the political control of this "multilateral" force. As the proposal is now conceived, every member of the "multilateral" force is to have a veto over its use—although no announcement has been made as to how or at what level this veto would be exercised. Such a multiplicity of vetoes makes the force militarily useless because no commander could ever count on its being available.

Even more serious is the fact that it avoids the basic problem of Europe's understandable desire to be able to respond with its own nuclear weapons in its own defense in the event of attack.

As matters now stand, under the Administration proposals: if the U. S. is willing to respond with nuclear weapons, the NATO nuclear force with mixed crews will be unnecessary; if we are unwilling to respond with nuclear weapons, such a NATO force will be inactive.

In other words, the proposed so-called "multilateral" nuclear force neither meets nor changes the situation which has given rise to European pressures for a measure of nuclear defense autonomy.

We would continue to hold the final voice in nuclear matters. This may be what the Administration wants, but no matter how disguised with labels of multilateralism, it clearly is neither partnership nor community.

It might be argued that we could or would eventually give up the veto. No doubt we will be subjected to pressures in that direction once such a mixed-crew force exists. Yet as long as NATO is composed of sovereign states, such an arrangement is unworkable.

This country cannot commit itself to go to nuclear war on the basis of a majority vote of its allies, however close those allies may be. Indeed, if we could make such a commitment, a "multilateral" force would not be necessary.

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The proposed NATO "multilateral" force of mixed crews on merchant ships has other drawbacks. With France refusing to participate and Britain making only a token contribution Europe will be split still further.

As now projected, Germany will be the largest single European contributor—forty per cent of the total cost and seventy per cent of the European expenses of the force will be charged to her.

This is likely to create two problems: within Germany, pressures are bound to mount for a degree of control commensurate with the German contribution. We will then confront the same issue which we are now evading with respect to France and Britain. In the rest of Europe, resistance may develop to the notion of a German-dominated force. This in turn will play into the hands of Soviet pressures designed to divide the West.

Thus our present nuclear policy may encourage both neutralism and nationalism, and do so simultaneously.

In addition, our policy will not arrest the proliferation of nuclear weapons. If anything, the contemplated crazy-quilt of nuclear forces within NATO brings about the very proliferation it claims that it seeks to avoid.

These forces would consist of:

1. U. S. strategic nuclear forces which represent the vast preponderance of allied strength and would remain under exclusive United States control;
2. Tactical nuclear elements of ground and air forces of a majority of the NATO nations but with nuclear warheads subject to release only by the President of the United States;
3. Certain similar elements of British forces having their own nuclear warheads not subject to Presidential release;
4. The small French strategic nuclear force now being built which will remain under exclusive French control—though President DeGaulle has offered to "coordinate" it with NATO;
5. A relatively-small so-called "interallied" force (formerly called "multilateral"), composed of national contingents from the United States and Britain and technically "assigned" to NATO but in the last analysis under national control;
6. A so-called "multilateral" force manned by mixed crews with every participant including the United States having a veto.

This is not a "grand design," but a prescription for chaos.

It is high time that Washington freed itself of the delusion that it is possible to maintain a position of nuclear monopoly which has already vanished. The Administration must come to terms with the reality of a world in which our allies, as well as our enemies have developed nuclear capabilities of their own. The Administration's opposition to the nuclear programs of close allies is not only futile; it keeps us from exercising leadership in the crucial area of strategic doctrine.

There is no way of fudging the issue. We can no longer ask our European allies to forego a power of decision affecting their own survival—a power which we in our case rightly reserve for ourselves. We must not offer gimmicks which in the name of partnership try to establish single U. S. control over all the nuclear weapons of the Alliance. This is not only wrong—it is also bound to fail.

The goal of a self-reliant Europe assuming increasing responsibility for its own defense is to our interest. A militarily strong Europe is no more inconsistent with Atlantic partnership than an economically vital one.

Of course, weak and dependent satellites are more tractable than proud independent allies. They will also be more unreliable in times of stress.

We cannot avoid facing a certain number of grave risks, regardless of what course we follow. Therefore, it is a question of which risks most seriously threaten our security and freedom—and the security and freedom of our allies and the free world generally.

However great our concern about the risks that are inherent in having more than one source of nuclear capability in the Atlantic community, these are risks which exist now and with which we have to live.

An even greater risk is that the existence of several nuclear capabilities, in the absence of a realistic and solidly agreed-upon arrangement for control and employment, will introduce divisive rivalries that will prevent the development of a unified strategy in which both we and Europe can have confidence.

A constructive American policy therefore will accept a European nuclear capability and try to relate it to ours for common ends.

But by trying to reestablish a position of atomic monopoly that already has been lost, we are sacrificing the possibility of making any real progress toward a broad political framework within which the free nations of the Atlantic can work in accord.

It seems to me that Jean Monnet, that great European and great friend of the United States, has understood better than anyone the realities of the revolutionary changes that have taken place and are taking place in Europe, and the means of shaping them to secure our common ends.

As he remarked recently:

"It is difficult to conceive that the people of Europe will commit themselves to a common economic effort without a common political design and, necessarily, this will lead to a common defense. England is part of Europe. It must participate in the common defense which is necessary for the equilibrium and the peace of the world.

"But the participation of the United States is required as well to assure the defense of Europe. In order for that indispensable participation to be established on a lasting basis, a relationship of equal partnership between the United States and Europe must be established . . .

"This relationship of equal partnership must apply also to the common defense. It requires, among other steps, the organization of a European atomic force including Great Britain, and in partnership with the United States."

I believe that M. Monnet admirably defines the spirit that must govern any approach to this field that can have prospect of success.

I suggest that the tangible elements of such an approach should include the following:

1. As the European nations demonstrate their desire and capability to share responsibility for their own nuclear defense, we should be prepared to work with them for common goals.

2. As European and Atlantic political cohesion grows, our goal should be the formation of a combined European nuclear force related to the American nuclear force on a basis of genuine partnership and dedicated to the defense of the NATO area in line with the suggestions of Jean Monnet.

3. Toward this end, and on such terms as to facilitate this goal we should actively assist the British and the French in order to bring into being as soon as possible nuclear forces which can serve as the core of a truly European nuclear force.

4. To make the assistance possible, we should in our own nation's interest amend the McMahon Act to give us the flexibility required. Our material assistance should be in the form of sales—not grants—and the scale of the assistance should be related to progress toward European integration.

5. There should be appointed a top-level NATO committee to review the NATO structure to the end that NATO may fully utilize the entire nuclear potential available to it including that of Europe.

III. The Political Prospect

However, we must not lose sight of the fact that military security can never be an end in itself.

The ultimate hope for the free world resides in the development of a political and economic structure which permits all free peoples to live in dignity and freedom.

The nations bordering the North Atlantic have a special responsibility in this respect. These countries enjoy a high and rising standard of living.

Most of them share democratic values and institutions. They have a unique opportunity to demonstrate that the deepest and most lasting unity grows out of the voluntary agreement of free peoples.

They must forge unity while respecting diversity—and they should create a structure which is to the ultimate benefit of all the peoples of the world and not simply of a single regional grouping.

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In striving to reach these objectives, we must guard against two contradictory dangers:

—We must not let an ultimate goal serve as an excuse for not dealing with immediate problems.

—We must not become so enamoured of short-term technical solutions that we forget the purpose they are designed to serve.

The ultimate goal is an expanding economy within a vital free world structure. Essential immediate steps are the strengthening of the cohesion and vitality of Europe and of the political unity of the Western Alliance.

It makes no sense to speak of the indivisibility of strategy while each member of the Alliance conducts a separate diplomacy and while in the economic field short term regional advantages are sometimes pressed at the expense of the common advantage.

I would therefore urged the creation of a permanent body at the highest level charged with exploring the means of strengthening the cohesion of the nations bordering the North Atlantic.

Such a body should, of course, cooperate to the fullest with whatever European institutions emerge out of the process of European integration.

The U. S. representative to this body should have the same status as our representative to the United Nations—that is he should be of cabinet rank.

This permanent group should be charged with exploring areas of common action. It should work on a common policy for relations with the Soviet Union, particularly with respect to negotiations.

It should address itself to a long-term projection of NATO strategy (while the NATO Council deals with immediate problems). One of its most important tasks should be to devise policies which enable other regions, such as Latin America, Japan and the other Pacific nations, Southeast Asia and Africa, to participate in the progress of the Atlantic area on a basis of equality and mutual respect.

In pursuing this course we would do well to keep in mind that men are moved by ideals and values and not simply by cold calculations. There is nothing automatic about the shape of the future. It is compounded of the vision and the daring and the courage of the present.

At Annual Spring Festival, Adelphi College, Garden City, Long Island, May 2, 1963 (Excerpts)

Higher Education

W. Allen Wallis, president of the University of Rochester, remarked not long ago that "New York has by far the best system of higher education of any state."

President Wallis went on to explain that this was so, in his words, "partly because (New York's) colleges and universities are as good as those of any state, but even more because the State government does the best job of making New York's colleges and universities available to the students of the State." He cited in support of the latter statement the State's Regents scholarships, Scholar Incentive Awards and Student loan program.

As a Governor whose administration initiated the Scholar Incentive program and substantially broadened the Regents scholarship and student loan programs, I am naturally gratified by President Wallis' observations. This is not, however, the reason I have chosen to quote him. I have done so because President Wallis' remarks led him and led me to some observations on the vital importance of diversity in higher education.

No one is in a better position than the individual student to know what kind of college will best suit his or her abilities and interests—and it follows that no one has a stronger incentive to see that he or she makes the most of the educational opportunities available at the college chosen.

New York's system of higher education offers such rich diversity of educational opportunities because it developed, first of all, through private institutions, each with its own individuality, approach and emphasis. Sixty per cent

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Statement by the Governor Commending the Bi-State Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor for Uncovering a Theft Ring Operating on Piers in New York Harbor

STATE OF NEW YORK—EXECUTIVE CHAMBER

ALBANY, February 9, 1963

Governor Rockefeller today commended the two Commissioners of the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor and the Commission's staff for their well-executed investigation that led to the arrest yesterday of sixteen persons charged with stealing merchandise valued at over five hundred thousand dollars from various interstate and overseas shipments on piers in New York harbor.

The New York member of the Waterfront Commission is Joseph Kaitz of Cedarhurst, Long Island. The New Jersey member is David C. Thompson of Glen Ridge, New Jersey. The investigation was joined by Federal agents, New Jersey State Police and New York City police.

Governor Rockefeller said:

"The Bi-State Waterfront Commission is to be commended for successfully concluding one of the most dramatic and significant law enforcement investigations conducted by the Commission since its creation ten years ago. Undercover investigators of the Waterfront Commission, posing as receivers of the stolen property, carefully assembled important evidence culminating in today's arrests made with the cooperation of investigators from the U. S. Customs Service and the Office of the U. S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York. As a result of this excellent surveillance and undercover work, all of the stolen property was recovered and is safely stored away."

The Waterfront Commission Compact was entered into by the States of New York and New Jersey in 1953 and was designed to eliminate criminal and corrupt practices in the handling of waterborne freight within the port of New York and to regulate employment of waterfront labor. Since its creation the Waterfront Commission has been effectively discharging its responsibilities and the Legislatures of both States from time to time have cooperated in the enactment of companion measures to implement the provisions of the Compact.

Statement by the Governor Concerning the Present Disarray within the Atlantic Alliance

STATE OF NEW YORK—EXECUTIVE CHAMBER

ALBANY, February 9, 1963

All Americans concerned about the future of freedom must be deeply worried about the present disarray within the Atlantic Alliance.

In the space of two months, the United States has been embroiled in heated and public controversy with Great Britain on the Skybolt

issue, with Canada on the nuclear defense of North America, and with France on the organization of Europe and the defense of the Atlantic area.

In less than a year, the American Government has also publicly quarreled with Chancellor Adenauer over negotiations in Berlin, and has affronted The Netherlands by placing expediency over principle in West New Guinea.

Of course, it is the duty of the President of the United States to defend American interests as he conceives them. He must uphold our country's defense and its political and economic interests—if necessary, even against our allies.

In common with all Americans, I want the President to succeed, for if he succeeds, the country succeeds. Last October, in common with all Americans, I strongly supported the President's action in seeking the removal of Soviet missile bases from Cuba.

But by the same token, where it appears that the course the President is pursuing will lead to failure, it is the duty of every concerned citizen to speak out plainly in the national interest, to voice his misgivings, and to suggest alternatives.

We must never lose sight of the fact that one of our most precious assets is the unity of the Free Nations. Preservation and strengthening of that unity is clearly in the self-interest of the United States.

It is indisputably in the interest of the United States that Western Europe be strong and self-reliant—an interest consistently upheld by two previous administrations since World War II.

It is in the interest of the national security of the United States—and in the interest of Europe—that Europe share in its own defense and work with us for the achievement of positive ends.

While this administration has paid lip service to these principles, as the President did again at his press conference on February seventh, we must realize that an important reason for the disarray in the West is the administration's failure to live up to these principles.

Unity is not achieved by proclamation. A "grand design" does not come into being by enunciating the phrase.

Partnership is not furthered by the sudden and unilateral abrogation, without consultation, of an understanding to supply a weapon around which the strategic forces of our closest ally, Great Britain, were to be built.

Unity is not enhanced by interfering publicly in the sensitive domestic issues of our northern neighbor, Canada.

A "grand design" is not established by public attacks on the leader of a great and friendly country, France—a leader who, moreover, in Winston Churchill's phrase, "has not always been wrong."

The official and semi-official criticisms of President DeGaulle in representing "obsolete" ideas, as seized by Napoleonic visions and determined to make separate deals with the Soviets are unworthy of the foreign policy of a great country.

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It behooves us to remember that this is the man who stood out against Hitler, who restored to France its dignity, who reduced the Communist threat within his country, and who proved to be one of our staunchest friends in the critical hours of the Cuban crisis.

It is not necessary to agree with all of President DeGaulle's actions or formulations. I believe, for example, that he was wrong in vetoing Britain's entry into the Common Market. But we must also face the fact that a policy unable to deal with great men may lack great conceptions.

Strong men are likely to be difficult. They are also likely to prove more reliable friends in times of crises than those who adjust to every passing pressure.

Before engaging in hints about the possibility of separate French deals with the Soviets, we should recall that it was the present administration which set the precedent.

In 1961, it negotiated with the Soviets over Berlin against the wishes of France and against the better judgment of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The administration then strongly implied that it was ready to enter into arrangements which would involve recognition of Communist Eastern Germany in some form, and thus to weaken our long-standing commitment to German unification.

Since Cuba, there have been several secret exchanges of letters between the President and Premier Khrushchev, of which only those dealing with nuclear testing have become public and then only because Premier Khrushchev released them.

A policy which in the space of less than a year has produced disputes with so many key allies as France, Great Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany and Canada is bound to cause deep concern about the unity of the free world.

My concern, however, is not the past. The urgent need today is to strengthen the community of free Nations, based on respect for diversity and the consensus of shared aspirations of free peoples.

This is the great responsibility and challenge before the West. Its realization is being impeded by two great controversies: The organization of nuclear defense, and the organization of Europe—the Common Market.

I will discuss the issue of nuclear defense first, because this issue has torn NATO the longest—and led to the division which contributed to the exclusion of Britain from the Common Market.

I. The Organization of Nuclear Defense

The issue of nuclear defense involves highly complicated technical questions, but the basic point in dispute is relatively simple. The United States has taken the view that the American nuclear arsenal is ample for all purposes of the Alliance. Our European allies have insisted that they must have the possibility to resist with their own nuclear arms the Soviet weapons deployed against them—which they have been told exceed in number those aimed at the United States.

The issue is thus not so much technical as political and psychological. Our European allies—and in this respect Great Britain has held essentially the same view as France—have maintained that they must share in the responsibility for nuclear defense. This was well expressed by Viscount Hailsham of Great Britain in a recent speech in New York in which he said:

"Have the Americans paused to reflect that an alliance in which all the advanced and sophisticated technologies were left to one of the partners, and the rest were relegated to supply a complement of conventional arms in war, and in commerce a modest contribution of Scotch whisky and compact cars . . . would *not* ultimately succeed in retaining the loyalty of European electors?"

Much of the nuclear controversy has been caused by the tendency of the present Administration to use words like "interdependence" while perpetuating in fact the dependence of the Europeans on American-controlled nuclear weapons.

This becomes clear if we examine the proposals which the present administration has made on the issue of nuclear control.

In May, 1961, the President, in a speech at Ottawa, offered to commit five nuclear (Polaris) submarines to NATO and subsequently more. A year later, Secretary of Defense McNamara announced that the five submarines had already been committed to NATO with more to come.

When we consider what this "commitment" means, we find that it transfers these submarines from an American Admiral acting as U. S. Commander-in-Chief, Atlantic, to the same American Admiral, using the same headquarters, acting as NATO Supreme Commander, Atlantic.

In other words, the submarines really never left U. S. control. The announced "assignment" to NATO was only symbolic.

Also in May of 1961, the President announced a willingness to consider a NATO nuclear sea-based force "truly multilateral in ownership and control." Since then, this offer has been repeated on the following conditions:

1. If Europe increased its conventional forces;
2. If Europe came up with an acceptable control system for nuclear weapons;
3. If the crews on the submarines represented different nationalities.

We have repeatedly pointed out, however, that we thought a NATO nuclear force militarily unnecessary.

This offer presented our allies with a serious, if not insoluble dilemma.

Most of our allies disagree with the U. S. insistence on a conventional build-up to begin with. However, if they carried it out, they would have to increase their defense budgets anywhere from 15 to 40 percent (depending on the country) for the conventional build-up alone. To add to these expenditures the very large additional expenditures needed for a multilateral Polaris force put the

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political leaders of Europe in the position of having to ask their parliaments for budget increases which were (1) enormous and (2) declared by us to be militarily unnecessary as far as atomic weapons were concerned.

This was politically impossible. No wonder many of our allies questioned whether our offer was meant to be accepted or rejected.

If we turn to the purely military problem, the situation is equally confused. Most U. S. military leaders have serious reservations about relying primarily on a sea-based nuclear force for the defense of the NATO area. Almost all of them consider the notion of submarine crews of mixed nationalities a monstrosity.

It requires eighteen months to train a purely *American* Polaris crew, and up to twelve months just to select it. To force crews of different nationalities to live aboard a submarine for months at a time will present enormous problems of morale.

And what would actually be accomplished? Surely the threat of mutiny is not an appropriate means to arrive at the control of weapons which affect the vital interests of each ally.

Nuclear partnership of the Atlantic Alliance cannot be established through the use of technical gimmicks. It requires a *political* solution.

With respect to the political control of a multilateral force, the administration's attitude has been equally ambiguous. To begin with, it has really proposed two multilateral forces: (a) one composed of submarines manned by mixed crews of the non-nuclear NATO powers and (b) another composed of the national forces of the nuclear powers, France and Britain together with a United States contribution.

In both instances, we have offered to match the contribution of the European nations. The net effect of this offer would be to leave 95 percent of our nuclear force *outside* NATO control while *all* of the nuclear forces of our allies would become subject to multilateral control.

This might not be decisive had we ever offered any idea of what we mean by multilateral control. In effect, we have asked countries which do not possess nuclear submarines, missiles or warheads to devise a control mechanism for these weapons on a multi-national basis.

Considering the difficulty of devising a control mechanism even on a national basis, it is no accident that no progress has been made on the organization of a NATO nuclear force.

Then there is the problem of the United States veto. So far, we have insisted on retaining a veto over the use of the nuclear warheads in the projected NATO force. Under such circumstances, if we would want to use nuclear weapons and the European allies were to disagree, the NATO nuclear force would be inactive, but we could still use the nuclear weapons of the Strategic Air Command. If the situation were reversed, no nuclear weapons would be used at all.

In other words, the NATO nuclear force proposed by the present administration is not an act of partnership but a device which would give the Europeans only a negative control over the small NATO nuclear force which we have declared militarily "unnecessary."

With respect to the other multilateral force—that composed of national contingents—it is important to understand that the administration has consistently attacked the nuclear programs of our allies. President Kennedy has declared the French national nuclear force dangerous and inimical to the Alliance. Secretary McNamara has used similar words and added strictures of his own. Our allies have bitterly resented this intrusion into what they consider their sovereign concerns as free peoples.

Then following the uproar caused by the unilateral U. S. cancellation of Skybolt, the President at Nassau offered Polaris missiles to Prime Minister Macmillan. The same offer was made to France. In return, France and Britain were to supply their own warheads and submarines, and assign their nuclear forces to a NATO multilateral force.

This sequence of events created a domestic crisis for the Macmillan government, even though the government accepted our offer. France rejected it.

Before we begin reviling France for this action, we must recognize that the Nassau Agreement is a document of extraordinary ambiguities.

It says nothing about who deploys the submarines; how the multilateral force is to be controlled; how national governments can exercise their control. Indeed, since communication to the submarines must be through American channels, it is not clear how Great Britain can exercise its theoretical right to independent action.

Moreover, France has no warheads for Polaris missiles and no prospects of getting them for years to come. It has no submarines in which to install them.

Finally, almost simultaneously with the offer, President Kennedy was exchanging secret letters with Premier Khrushchev about a nuclear test ban treaty. Had these resulted in a treaty and had France gone along—as we urged—France could never have developed the warheads for the missiles which we were offering.

In these circumstances, should we really have been so surprised that our offer was rejected by DeGaulle?

Is it partnership to offer on a take-it-or-leave-it basis a weapons system about which our ally was not consulted, and under conditions which are extremely nebulous?

Would it not have been more statesmanlike to urge Prime Minister Macmillan to use his influence with France to establish a joint—ultimately European—nuclear force to be coordinated with ours for the defense of NATO?

President DeGaulle has not rejected cooperation or coordination, on the contrary, he has explicitly affirmed it.

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Before engaging in personal attacks, would it not have been wiser to find out how he proposes to coordinate his forces with ours?

To sum up: I strongly believe in the Atlantic Community. But we will not achieve this goal by technical gimmicks or sharp formulas. The basic problem is political. NATO cannot survive on the basis of mutual distrust. If it is painful for us to be accused of unreliability, it is equally galling for countries with the traditions of Great Britain and France to be thought untrustworthy with respect to the possession of nuclear weapons.

The nuclear issue within NATO has arisen because the strongest of our allies are trying to do what we have so often urged—namely, to share in the responsibility for their own defense. This attitude is in our own interest.

I would therefore urge that we take immediate steps to establish a real nuclear defense partnership with Europe. The internal organization of Europe's nuclear power, including Great Britain's, should be left to the Europeans. Our goal should be to coordinate such a European force with ours through the establishment of a political control body within NATO dealing with nuclear matters for the Alliance as a whole.

II. The Common Market

For all of us who have admired Great Britain's historic role, it was a source of regret that its entry into the Common Market was thwarted—even if only temporarily. I disagree that Britain would have been a lukewarm member of the European community. On the contrary, I believe that it would have entered Europe wholeheartedly, and that Europe would have benefited from its wisdom and courage.

Nevertheless, I have serious doubts about the administration's reaction to this event. I do not discover the specifically American interest that leads us to encourage groupings in Europe designed to isolate France or to present Franco-German amity as dangerous to NATO. It is not in the interest of Britain; it is not in the interest of Europe; and above all it is not in our interest to fragment Europe still further.

It is not in the long-term interest of Britain to be pushed into the Common Market by United States pressure. This will reinforce suspicions of Britain's role. It will in the long run embarrass Britain. It may split into pro- and anti-American camps on an issue which is most properly a European concern.

To organize or encourage rival blocs in Europe, to imply that there is a choice between France and the United States, is to jeopardize still further all the achievements of the past decade and a half toward European and Atlantic unity. The result may be a resurgence of nationalism throughout Europe. Such an event would be against our national interests.

Instead of a strong partner, we will have to deal with scores of competing rivalries. The Communists would be tempted to exploit our divisions—and the new nations would lose a vital source of strength.

III. Conclusion

The disarray in our relations with Europe calls urgent attention to the need for re-examination of our processes of government in the international field.

Something is wrong if, at a moment when Britain's membership in the Common Market hung delicately in the balance, we cancelled Skybolt and thus contributed to the collapse of the Common Market negotiations whose success we so urgently desired.

Something is wrong if at a moment when we should be demonstrating the unity of the Alliance, we became embroiled with Canada.

Something is plainly wrong in our relationships with France.

The erratic and vacillating nature of our policies—illustrated by the gimmickry of our proposals for the nuclear defense of NATO—calls attention to the need for a clearer determination of national purposes and a strategy to attain them.

The Administration has used toward our allies the same ruthless and precipitate methods employed domestically. These actions have shaken confidence—the most precious asset of any leader of an Alliance.

The way to deal with the present crisis in the Alliance is to avoid recriminations. We will not establish partnership by talking about it in the abstract. The way to counter Third Force tendencies is to act so that the advantages of united action will always outweigh the temptations of narrower conceptions. This of course requires that we stop acting like a Third Force.

The temporary failure of Britain's entry into the Common Market must not produce a paralysis in our Atlantic policy. There are a number of things we can do immediately.

We should propose a comprehensive trade agreement with Britain and the Commonwealth to increase free world trade.

The U. S. Trade Expansion Act of last year granted part of its tariff-cutting power to the President on the assumption of Britain's admission to the Common Market. Now there will be far less use for that power unless the Trade Act is amended—something which the President said last Thursday he "had not planned" to seek but "would support" if the Congress "shows any disposition to favor it."

It seems to me that this is a point on which the President should take vigorous leadership, rather than await Congressional initiative.

It is high time for the Alliance to create a political body to set common goals and to develop common policies. Bilateralism is dangerous by whomever practiced.

The leadership of a coalition of free countries is of course always far more exacting than the direction of an empire. But we should always remember that the power and purpose generated by the voluntary cooperation of free societies can never be equalled by the reluctant compliance of nations treated like subjects.

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